After yesterday’s focus on the physical fundamentals and applications of antimony, today’s article addresses the political dimensions of the antimony issue. The key questions are: Who controls the processing? What means of power does China employ – and how does the West react to them?
The processing of antimony ores into metallic antimony, antimony oxide, and other compounds is an energy-intensive and technologically demanding process. Globally, China dominates refining capacities, accounting for over 80 percent of global primary production. The main centers of Chinese antimony processing are the provinces of Hunan, Guangxi, and Yunnan.
Outside China, there are only a few relevant processing sites. Russia operates its own smelters, but these are primarily used for domestic consumption. Belgium, with the Olen refinery site, formerly part of the Umicore group, possesses European capacities. However, its operation is heavily dependent on raw material imports. Bolivia and Tajikistan primarily export ore and concentrates; neither country exports finished products on a large scale. In the USA, domestic production was gradually discontinued. The last major antimony mine in the US state of Montana ceased operations in the 2000s.
For the West, the current situation regarding antimony is therefore anything but favorable, as the extreme concentration of processing capacities in China creates a dangerous one-sided dependency. This is particularly concerning with regard to security-relevant sectors such as defense and energy storage.
China can starve the West not only of rare earths
China, on the other hand, is all too aware of its own power in this sector, and the Chinese government no longer hesitates to use this power. In August 2024, the communist leadership in Beijing announced far-reaching export restrictions for antimony and antimony-containing compounds, which came into force in September 2024. Affected products include antimony metal, antimony oxide, and antimony ore concentrates. Exporters have since required state permits, the granting of which is tied to strategic criteria.
China’s motives are multifaceted: On the one hand, the restrictions serve to protect its own resources, as China’s antimony reserves could be depleted within a few decades at the current rate of extraction. On the other hand, Beijing aims to increase domestic value creation. Instead of exporting raw materials, processed products with higher margins are to be manufactured domestically and then sold on the world market.
The third motive is geopolitically the most significant: China uses antimony as a strategic leverage in the context of the escalating technology and trade war with the USA and the European Union. The restrictions were announced shortly after tightened American export controls for semiconductors and AI technologies and are therefore to be understood as a targeted countermeasure.
The Chinese leadership’s approach follows a proven pattern: Already in 2023, China imposed export restrictions on gallium and germanium, two other key raw materials for the semiconductor industry. A year later, antimony followed, making it part of a deliberate Chinese raw material strategy aimed at specifically pressuring Western high-tech sectors.
Between Panic and a New Antimony Strategy – The West Strives for an Appropriate Response to the Chinese Threat
Western governments’ reactions to China’s antimony export restrictions are a mix of short-term alarm and medium-term strategy development. Immediately after the announcement, antimony prices on international markets surged. This extreme price increase can hardly be interpreted as anything other than a clear signal of the vulnerability of Western supply chains.
The United States responded by intensifying its Critical Minerals Initiative. The Department of Energy and the Department of Defense adopted funding programs to reactivate domestic mining projects. In Europe, the EU Commission and individual member states initiated emergency reviews of their raw material dependencies. The EU’s Critical Raw Materials Act (CRMA), which came into force in 2024, explicitly provides for measures to diversify the supply of antimony and other critical raw materials.
At the same time, Western countries are intensifying diplomatic efforts to find alternative suppliers: Bolivia, Australia, Canada, and various African states are seen as potential partners, and future cooperation with them is being explored. Recycling programs for antimony-containing materials are also gaining political and economic attention.
Western countries must develop a roadmap for supply security
To establish an independent and secure antimony supply, structural measures are required at several levels:
- Firstly, Western governments must invest in the development of their own raw material deposits. In the USA, Canada, Australia, and several European countries such as Sweden and Finland, there are known antimony deposits that have not yet been mined due to cost reasons or environmental regulations. These are now of primary interest. State guarantees, accelerated approval procedures, and direct subsidies could bring these properties into production more quickly and enable a breakthrough.
- Secondly, the establishment of proprietary refining and processing capacities is indispensable. Even if ores are sourced from other countries, the West remains vulnerable as long as antimony processing primarily takes place in China. The development of smelting technologies and the establishment of processing plants in the EU and the USA should therefore be classified as activities with industrial policy priority.
- Thirdly, existing supply partnerships with resource-rich countries in the Global South must be deepened or new ones established. However, these partnerships must be concluded under fair conditions that also consider the development interests of the raw material countries. Partnerships with Bolivia, Tajikistan, or Namibia should be long-term and additionally accompanied by investments in local infrastructure.
- Fourthly, technologies for recovering antimony from old materials must be promoted. The crucial keyword here is so-called urban mining. Since antimony is present in many products, targeted recycling offers significant potential to reduce the primary demand for antimony.
- Fifthly, research programs for the development of substitute materials should be promoted long-term – even if a complete replacement for antimony is not in sight in the short term. The establishment of strategic reserves similar to oil reserves also provides time for structural adjustments.
Everything depends on political will and investors’ willingness to take risks
The West’s dependence on Chinese antimony is not a technical but a political problem. Its solution therefore requires political will, international cooperation, and significant investment. Because the alternative, a sustained vulnerability to China’s raw material policy, is not an option in the long run.
Because the development of proprietary antimony deposits is a central component of this defense strategy, far-sighted investors can profit from it if they participate early in the development and exploration of new antimony projects. Since antimony very often occurs together with gold, some gold producers or gold mine developers are in the comfortable position of potentially being able to free Western states from their antimony weakness.
One such company is Rua Gold (WKN A40QYC / TSX RUA). The company is quite typical in this regard, as it primarily searches for gold but possesses deposits that are naturally also blessed with antimony. Investors who wish to profit from the Western pursuit of greater independence from China should look at companies like these. More on this exciting story:
